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Distributed team formation in multi-agent systems:
stability and approximation
Lorenzo Coviello and Massimo Franceschetti
Abstract
We consider a scenario in which leaders are required to recruit teams of followers. Each leader
cannot recruit all followers, but interaction is constrained according to a bipartite network. The objective
for each leader is to reach a state of local stability in which it controls a team whose size is equal to a
given constraint. We focus on distributed strategies, in which agents have only local information of the
network topology and propose a distributed algorithm in which leaders and followers act according to
simple local rules. The performance of the algorithm is analyzed with respect to the convergence to a
stable solution.
Our results are as follows. For any network, the proposed algorithm is shown to converge to an
approximate stable solution in polynomial time, namely the leaders quickly form teams in which the
total number of additional followers required to satisfy all team size constraints is an arbitrarily small
fraction of the entire population. In contrast, for general graphs there can be an exponential time gap
between convergence to an approximate solution and to a stable solution.
I. Introduction
A multi-agent system (MAS) is composed of many interacting intelligent agents. Agents can
be software, robots, or humans, and the system is highly distributed, as agents do not have
a global view of the state and act autonomously of each other. These systems can be used
to collectively solve problems that are difficult to solve by a single entity. Their application
ranges from robotics, to disaster response, social structures, crowd-sourcing etc. A main feature
of MAS is that they can manifest self-organization as well as other complex control paradigms
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2even when the individual strategies of the agents are very simple. In short, simple local interaction
can conspire to determine complex global behaviors. Examples of such emerging behaviors are
in economics and game theory, where local preferences translate into global equilbria [35], in
social sciences, where local exposure governs the spread of innovation [41], and in control,
where local decision rules determine whether and how rapidly consensus is reached [4], [28],
[29], [30], [36], [37].
From a practical perspective, the performance of a MAS often depends on how quickly
convergence to a global, possibly approximate, solution is reached and it is in general influenced
by the network structure. For example, in the context of information diffusion in social networks,
the rate of convergence of the system’s dynamics is affected by the underlaying network and the
local interaction rules [21], [26].
One of the critical issues in multi-agent systems is coordination. Due to the autonomous
behavior of the agents and to the absence of a central controller, coordination must be distributed.
In the case of human agents, it is also important that the distributed control algorithm is simple
enough to be suitable to model basic principles of human behavior [8]. Two prominent problems
related to consensus and coordination in multi-agent systems are leader election and group
formation. In the former case, multiple agents elect a leader that can then assign tasks [24],
while in the latter they divide themselves into teams in such a way that each agent knows to
what team it belongs [11]. In both cases agents are all equal and coordination occurs among
agents of a single class.
We consider a scenario in which there are agents of two classes, leaders and followers. Each
leader must recruit a team of followers whose size is equal to a given constraint, by sending
requests to the followers. Followers can only accept or reject incoming leaders’ requests. While
multiple followers can be part of a leader’s team, each follower can be part of a single team at any
time, but is allowed to change team over time. Moreover, a leader cannot recruit all followers, but
can only recruit the followers it is in direct communication with. The communication structure
between leaders and followers is captured by an arbitrary bipartite network, and we assume
that each agent has knowledge of and can interact with its neighbors only. That is, agents only
have local knowledge of the underlying network. In general, the communication constraints of
the population (and therefore the structure of the bipartite network) can be dictated by physical
constraints (as for example antenna visibility range or signal to noise ratio threshold), social
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Fig. 1. Example of a bipartite network between leaders and followers determined by physical constraints. Left: each leader
can only recruit the followers in its visibility range (dotted circle), arrows represent team membership, and the set of arrows
defines a partition of the followers into teams.
Right: the resulting bipartite network. An edge between leader ℓ and follower f exists if and only if f is in ℓ’s visibility range.
Matching edges define team membership and are highlighted.
context, and so on. A pictorial representation of a bipartite network arising from physical
constraints is given in Figure 1.
We consider a notion of stability in which each agent controls a team of adequate size. Each
leader has an incentive to reach local stability (that is, to build a team of followers of the
right size) by dynamically interacting with its neighbors. The question we aim to answer is:
can simple local rules lead to stable, or close to stable, team formation in reasonable time? By
“close to stable” we mean that the total number of additional followers required to satisfy all
team size constraints is an arbitrary small fraction of the entire population. We propose a simple,
distributed, memoryless algorithm in which leaders do not communicate between each other, and
we show that, in any network of size n, any constant approximation of a stable outcome (or of
a suitably defined best outcome if a stable one does not exist) is reached in time polynomial
in n with high probability. In contrast, for general graphs we show through a counterexample
that there can be an exponential gap between the time needed to reach stability and that needed
to reach approximate stability, that is, to find the best solution compared to a good solution.
We remark that, in its simplicity, the proposed algorithm is suitable to model human agents, it
can be programmed on simple robots with limited computation abilities, and it is amenable to
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After discussing how our work relates to the
existing literature, in Section II we formally define the problem and the notions of stability
and approximate stability, in Section III we present the distributed algorithm for leaders and
followers, in Sections IV and V we present our technical results on the algorithm’s performance,
and in Section VI we further discuss the algorithm’s performance by showing some simulations’
results. To prove our result on the convergence to approximate stability, we derive a technical
lemma (Lemma 1) that relates the quality of a matching to the existence of particular paths (that
we call deficit-decreasing paths) of given length. The lemma extends a known combinatorial
result by Hopcroft and Karp [15] to the setup of many-to-one matching, and can be considered
to be of independent interest.
A. Related work
The problem of team formation that we consider is an example of distributed many-to-
one matching in bipartite networks [2], [14], [34]. The one-to-one case has been previously
studied in the context of theoretical computer science [23] [32]. In the control literature, our
work is related to the distributed assignment problem and to group formation in MAS. In this
framework, Moore and Passino [27] proposed a variant of the distributed auction algorithm for
the assignment of mobile agents to tasks. Cenedese et al. [6] proposed a variant of the Stable
Marriage algorithm [12] to solve the distributed task assignment problem. Abdallah and Lesser [1]
proposed an “almost” distributed algorithm for coalition formation, allowing for a special agent
with the role of “manager”. Gatson and den Jardins [13] studied a scenario of group formation
where agents can adapt to the network structure. Tosic and Agha [39] proposed an algorithm
for group formation based on the distributed computation of maximal cliques in the underlying
network. Further work studied team formation in multi-robot systems [40], in the case where
communication between agents is not allowed [3]. Other authors considered MAS composed by
leaders and followers. To cite a few, Tanner [38] derived a necessary and sufficient condition for
a group of interconnected agents to be controllable by one of them acting as a leader; Rahmani
et al. [33] studied the controlled agreement problem in networks in which certain agents have
leader roles, translating graph-theoretic properties into control-theoretic properties; Pasqualetti
et al. [31] analyzed the problem of driving a group of mobile agents, represented by a network
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5of leaders and followers, in which follower act according to a simple consensus rule.
We distinguish ourselves from all mentioned papers, as we propose a fully distributed algorithm
for group formation on arbitrary networks in which agents act according to simple local rules
and perform very limited computation, and we derive performance guarantees in the form of
theorems. For an exhaustive overview on distributed algorithms in multi-agent systems, the
interested reader is referred to the books by Lynch [24] and by Bullo et al. [5] and the references
therein, while the survey by Horling and Lesser [16] offers an overview on three decades of
research on organizational paradigms as team and coalition formation.
A more recent line of research aims to study how humans connected over a network solve tasks
in a distributed fashion [8], [10], [17], [19], [20], [25]. In the work of Kearns et al. [20], human
subjects positioned at the vertices of a virtual network were shown to be able to collectively
reach a coloring of the network, given only local information about their neighbors. Similar
papers further investigated human coordination in the case of coloring [10], [17], [25] and
consensus [17], [19], with the main goal of characterizing how performance is affected by the
network’s structure. Using experimental data of maximum matching games performed by human
subjects in a laboratory setting, Coviello et al. [8] proposed a simple algorithmic model of human
coordination that allows complexity analysis and prediction.
Finally, related to our work is also the research on social exchange networks [7], [22], that
considers a networked scenario in which each edge is associated to an economic value, nodes
have to come to an agreement on how to share these values, and each agent can only finalize
a single mutual exchange with a single neighbor. Recently, Kanoria et al. [18] proposed a
distributed algorithm that reaches approximate stability in linear time. However, we consider a
different setup since we allow leaders to build teams of multiple followers.
II. Problem formulation
We consider a population composed of agents of two different classes: leaders and followers.
Each leader is required to recruit a team of followers whose size is equal to a given constraint,
by sending requests to the followers. Followers can only accept or reject leaders’ requests. While
multiple followers can be in a leader’s team, each follower can be part of a single team at a time,
but is allowed to change team over time. A leader is not allowed to recruit all followers, but can
only recruit the followers it is in direct communication with. The communication constraints of
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6the population are captured by a bipartite network G = (L∪F, E) whose nodes’ partition is given
by the set L of leaders and the set F of followers, and where there exists an edge ( f , ℓ) ∈ E
between follower f and leader ℓ if and only if f and ℓ can communicate between each other
(see Figure 1). Let Nℓ = { f ∈ F : ( f , ℓ) ∈ E} be the neighborhood of ℓ ∈ L. For each ℓ ∈ L,
leader ℓ is required to recruit a team of cℓ followers, where cℓ ≥ 1.
Definition 1 (Matching): A subset M ⊆ E is a matching of G if for each f ∈ F there exists
at most a single ℓ ∈ L such that (ℓ, f ) ∈ M.
The definition of matching is consistent with the fact that multiple followers can be part of a
leader’s team. There is a one-to-one correspondence between matchings M of G and tuples of
teams {Tℓ(M) : ℓ ∈ L}, where Tℓ(M) denotes the team of leader ℓ under the matching M. We
have that Tℓ(M) = { f ∈ F : (ℓ, f ) ∈ M} ⊆ Nℓ for every matching M. We consider the following
notion of stability.
Definition 2 (Stable matching): Given constraints cℓ for each ℓ ∈ L, a matching M of G is
stable if and only if |Tℓ(M)| = cℓ for all ℓ ∈ L.
Depending on the constraints cℓ, a network G might not admit a stable matching. Nonetheless,
given a matching of G, we are interested in assessing its quality. Our main result builds on the
following definitions of deficit of a leader and deficit of a matching.
Definition 3 (Deficit of a leader): Let ℓ be a leader with constraint cℓ ≥ 1, and M be a
matching of G. The deficit of ℓ under the matching M is
dℓ(M) = cℓ − |Tℓ(M)|.
Definition 4 (Deficit of a matching): Given constraints cℓ ≥ 1 for each ℓ ∈ L, the deficit of a
matching M of G is
d(M) =
∑
ℓ∈L
dℓ(M) =
∑
ℓ∈L
(cℓ − |Tℓ(M)|) .
In words, dℓ(M) is the number of additional followers leader ℓ needs to satisfy its size
constraint. Similarly, d(M) sums the numbers of additional followers each leader needs to satisfy
its size constraint. Given a matching M, we say that a leader ℓ is poor if dℓ(M) > 0 (that is,
|Tℓ(M)| < cℓ) and stable if |Tℓ(M)| = cℓ. In this work, we do not consider the case of |Tℓ(M)| > cℓ
since we assume that each leader ℓ never recruits more than cℓ followers simultaneously. This
can be justified by the fact that recruiting additional followers might be costly.
DRAFT
7Observe that only poor leaders contribute to d(M), and that M is stable if and only if d(M) = 0.
Given G, two matchings of G can be compared with respect to their deficit, and the best matching
of G can be defined as one minimizing the deficit.
Definition 5 (Best matching): A matching M of G is a best matching of G if d(M) ≤ d(M′)
for every matching M′ of G.
Observe that a stable matching is also a best matching. Moreover, if G admits a stable
matching, d(M) quantifies how much M differs from a stable matching of G. In general, if
M∗ is a best matching of G with d(M∗) = d∗, then, d(M) − d∗ tells how much M differs from a
best matching of G. Given a matching M of G, the following definition provides a measure of
how well M approximates a best matching of G.
Definition 6 (Approximate best matching): Fix ε ∈ [0, 1], and let m be the number of followers
in G. Let M∗ be a best matching of G. Then, a matching M is a (1−ε)-approximate best matching
of G if d(M) − d(M∗) < εm.
When G admits a stable matching, we are interested in the notion of approximate stable
matching.
Definition 7 (Approximate stable matching): Let G admit a stable matching. Fix ε ∈ [0, 1],
and let m be the number of followers in G. Then, a matching M is a (1 − ε)-approximate stable
matching of G if d(M) < εm.
III. The algorithm
We now present a distributed algorithm for team formation. Time is divided into rounds, and
each round is composed by two stages. In the first stage, each leader acts according to the
algorithm in Table 1, and in the second stage each follower acts according to the algorithm in
Table 2.
First consider a leader ℓ, and let M be the matching at the beginning of a given round. If ℓ is
poor (that is, |Tℓ(M)| < cℓ) and |Tℓ(M)| < |Nℓ | (that is, ℓ is not already matched with all followers
in Nℓ) then, with probability p (where p ∈ (0, 1] is a fixed constant), ℓ attempts to recruit an
additional follower, chosen as explained below, by sending a matching request. An unmatched
follower in Nℓ, if any, is chosen uniformly at random; otherwise, a follower in Nℓ\Tℓ(M) is
chosen uniformly at random. In other words, leaders always prefer to recruit followers that are
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after checking if local stability holds (that is, after checking if its team size is equal to cℓ).
Consider now a follower f . During each round, if f has incoming requests then each request is
rejected independently of the others with probability 1− q (where q ∈ (0, 1] is a fixed constant).
If all incoming requests are rejected, then f does not change team (if currently matched) or
it remains unmatched (if currently unmatched). Otherwise, one among the active requests is
chosen uniformly at random, f joins the corresponding leader, and all the other requests are
discarded. For ease of presentation, we assume that a follower is equally likely to join a team
when unmatched and to change team when currently matched, but all our results hold if we
consider different values of q for matched and unmatched followers (and even if we consider a
different value of q for each follower, as long as each value is a constant).
Table 1 Algorithm for leader ℓ ∈ L
if |Tℓ(M)| < min{cℓ, |Nℓ|} then
with probability p do the following
if ∃ unmatched f ∈ Nℓ then
choose an unmatched follower f ′ ∈ Nℓ u.a.r.
else
choose a follower f ′ ∈ Nℓ\Tℓ(M) u.a.r.
end if
send a matching request to f ′
end if
The proposed algorithm enjoys several properties. It is memoryless, the actions of each agent
only depend on local information, and the leaders do not communicate between each other. Also,
it is self-stabilizing, that is, once a stable matching is reached, leaders stop recruiting followers.
Moreover, it is a single-stage algorithm, that is, agents never change their behavior until stability
is reached. Finally, observe that the exchanged messages can be represented by a single bit.
IV. Convergence to approximate stable matchings
In this section, we only consider networks admitting stable matchings, and we show that, given
any network and any constant ε ∈ (0, 1), a (1 − ε)-approximate stable matching is reached in a
DRAFT
9Table 2 Algorithm for follower f ∈ F
if f has incoming requests then
for each leader ℓ requesting f do
with probability 1 − q reject ℓ’s request
end for
if there are active requests then
select one u.a.r. and join the corresponding team
reject all other requests
end if
end if
number of rounds that is polynomial in the network size with high probability. The assumption
that a stable matching exists is for ease of presentation, and all our results also hold for reaching
approximate best matchings, by replacing d(M) with d(M)−d(M∗), where M∗ is a best matching
of G.
Given a network G, for every t ≥ 0, let M(t) be the matching of G at the beginning of round
t, with deficit d(M(t)). The next property follows from the fact that leaders do not voluntarily
disengage from the followers in their teams (and therefore the deficit of a leader increases of a
unit only if the deficit of another leader decreases by one unit).
Property 1: For t ≥ 0, d(M(t)) is non-increasing in t.
The next property follows from the assumption cℓ ≥ 1,∀ℓ.
Property 2: If G admits a stable matching, then d(M(t)) ≤ m for every t ≥ 0.
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 1: Let G be a network with m followers and which admits a stable matching. Let
∆ = maxℓ∈L |Nℓ | be the maximum degree of the leaders. Fix 0 < ε < 1, and let c ≥ 1 + 1m(1−ε) .
Then, a (1 − ε)-approximate stable matching of G is reached within c⌊1/ε⌋(∆/pq)⌊1/ε⌋m rounds
of the algorithm with probability at least 1 − e−cmε2/2.
Example 1: If ∆ is constant in the network size, then one can choose ε = 1/ log m, and
Theorem 1 implies that a (1 − 1/ log m)-approximate stable matching is reached in at most
O(m2 log m) rounds with probability that goes to one as m →∞.
To prove Theorem 1, we introduce the notion of deficit-decreasing path, that in our setup
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Fig. 2. A deficit-decreasing path of length 5 is represented at the top of the figure: ℓ0 is a poor leader, f3 is an unmatched
follower, and matching edges are highlighted. The path is “solved” by turning each matched edge into an unmatched edge and
vice versa, as show at the bottom of the figure: ℓ0 obtains an additional follower (and therefore its deficit decreases by a unit)
and both ℓ1 and ℓ2 do not change their numbers of followers.
plays the same role as the augmenting path in the context of one-to-one matching [9]. Since we
consider bipartite networks, a path alternates leaders and followers.
Definition 8 (Deficit-decreasing path): Given a matching M of G, a cycle-free path P =
ℓ0, f1, ℓ1, . . . , fk (of odd length 2k-1) is a deficit-decreasing path relative to M if (ℓi, fi) ∈ M
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, ℓ0 is a poor leader, and fk is an unmatched follower.
In words, a deficit-decreasing path starts at a poor leader with an edge not in M, ends at
a follower that is not matched, and alternates edges in M and edges not in M. To justify the
nomenclature, observe that, if d(M) > 0 and P is a deficit-decreasing path relative to M, a new
matching M′ such that d(M′) = d(M) − 1 can be obtained by flipping each unmatched edge of
P into a matched edge, and vice versa. This is depicted in Fig. 2.
The proof of Theorem 1 builds on a technical lemma that, given a matching M with d(M) ≥ εm,
guarantees the existence of a deficit-decreasing path of length at most 2⌊1/ε⌋. The existence of
such a path allows us to bound the number of rounds needed for a one-unit reduction of the
deficit. Our technical lemma extends a known result by Hopcroft and Karp [15, Theorem 1]
given in the context of one-to-one matching, but our proof is more subtle because leaders can be
matched to multiple followers and can have different size constraints cℓ. The symmetric difference
of two sets A and B is defined as A⊕ B = (A\B)∪ (B\A). Two paths are follower-disjoint if they
do not share any follower (even though they might share some leader).
Lemma 1: Let G admit a stable matching N. Let M be a matching of G with deficit d(M) > 0.
Then, in M ⊕ N there are at least d(M) follower-disjoint deficit-decreasing paths relative to M.
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Proof: See Appendix A.
We make use of Lemma 1 through the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Let G be a network with m followers, admitting a stable matching N. Let M
be a matching of G with deficit d(M) ≥ εm, for some ε > 0. Then, in M ⊕ N there exists a
deficit-decreasing path relative to M of length at most 2⌊1/ε⌋ − 1.
Proof: By Lemma 1, if d(M) ≥ εm and N is a stable matching of G, then in M ⊕N we can
choose εm follower-disjoint deficit-decreasing paths relative to M, whose cumulative length is
at most 2m (since they do not share followers and G is bipartite). Necessarily, one of them has
length at most 2⌊1/ε⌋ − 1 (note that a deficit-decreasing path has odd length).
We are now ready to present the proof of Theorem 1.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Let G be a network with m followers and which admits a stable matching. Fix 0 < ε < 1. For
t ≥ 0, M(t) denotes the matching at the beginning of round t. For every 0 < x ≤ 1, let
τ(x) = min
{
t ≥ 0 : d(M(t)) < xm
}
be the first round at whose beginning the deficit is strictly smaller than xm. We are interested
in bounding τ(ε).
Consider any round t ≥ 0. By Property 2, d(M(t)) ≤ m, and therefore there exists 0 < ε′ ≤ 1
such that d(M(t)) = ε′m (we assume ε′ > 0, since the case of ε′ = 0 is trivial). The following
lemma bounds the number of rounds τ(ε′)− t needed for a one-unit reduction of the deficit. Let
∆ = maxℓ∈L |Nℓ | be the maximum degree of the leaders in G.
Lemma 2: Let d(M(t)) = ε′m for some 0 < ε′ ≤ 1. Then
Pr
(
τ(ε′) − t ≤ ⌊1/ε′⌋
)
≥
( pq
∆
)⌊1/ε′⌋
.
Proof: Let h(t) ≥ 1 be the odd length of the shortest deficit-decreasing path relative to M(t).
By Corollary 1, h(t) ≤ 2⌊1/ε′⌋ − 1. We distinguish the cases of h(t) = 1 and h(t) ≥ 3.
First consider h(t) = 1. With probability at least pq/∆ the deficit decreases by at least one
unit during the next round of the algorithm. Too see this, consider a deficit-decreasing path ℓ, f .
With probability at least p/∆, ℓ attempts to recruit f and, conditional on this event, f considers
ℓ’s proposal with probability q, resulting in the lower bound pq/∆.
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Now consider h(t) ≥ 3, and let P be a shortest deficit-decreasing path of length h(t) ending
at an unmatched follower f . By the same argument as above, the length of P decreases by one
during the next round with probability at least pq/∆ (observe that, as long as h(t) > 1, f remains
unmatched during round t since P is a deficit decreasing path of shortest length).
By independence of successive rounds of the algorithm and the bound h(t) ≤ 2⌊1/ε′⌋−1, with
probability at least (pq/∆)⌊1/ε′⌋, a sequence of ⌊1/ε′⌋−1 rounds reduces the length of P to 1 and
then in one additional round P gets “solved” and the deficit decreases by one unit.
Consider consecutive phases of ⌊1/ε⌋ rounds each. For phases i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., let Xi be iid
Bernoulli random variables with Pr(Xi = 1) = (pq/∆)⌊1/ε⌋. By Lemma 2, after T phases (i.e., at
the beginning of round t∗ = T ⌊1/ε⌋), the deficit of the matching is upper bounded by
d(M(t∗)) < max
εm,m + 1 −
T∑
i=1
Xi
 ,
since by Property 2 the matching at the beginning of round 0 has deficit d(M(0)) ≤ m. By
independence of the phases, a Chernoff bound implies that for any 0 < δ ≤ 1
Pr
( T∑
i=1
Xi < (1 − δ)T (pq/∆)⌊1/ε⌋
)
< e−T (pq/∆)
⌊1/ε⌋δ2/2.
Setting δ = ε and T = cm(∆/pq)⌊1/ε⌋ (where c is a constant to be specified later), the deficit
of the matching at the beginning of round t∗ = ⌊1/ε⌋cm(∆/pq)⌊1/ε⌋ is upper bounded by
d(M(t∗)) < max {εm,m + 1 − (1 − ε)cm}
with probability at least 1 − e−cmε2/2. To conclude the proof of the theorem we need that εm ≥
m + 1 − (1 − ε)cm, which is true for any c ≥ 1 + 1
m(1−ε) .
V. Exponential convergence
Theorem 1 gives a polynomial bound for reaching a (1 − ε)-approximate stable matching for
any constant 0 < ǫ < 1 and any network. However, a similar guarantee cannot be derived for the
case of a stable matching, as shown in this section through a counterexample. In particular, we
define a sequence of networks of increasing size and maximum degree that diverges with the
network size, and show that the number of rounds required to converge from an approximate
matching M with d(M) = 1 to the stable matching (that is, to reduce the deficit of a single unit)
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is exponentially large in the network’s size with high probability from an overwhelming fraction
of the approximate matchings M such that d(M) = 1.
For n ≥ 1, let Gn = (Ln ∪ Fn, En) be the network with n leaders and n followers (i.e.,
Ln = {ℓ1, . . . , ℓn} and Fn = { f1, . . . , fn}), with edges En = {(ℓi, f j) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, j ≤ i}, and team size
constraints cℓ = 1 for all ℓ ∈ Ln, see Figure 3. Gn has maximum degree n and a unique stable
matching given by M∗n = {(ℓi, fi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Fig. 3. The network Gn for n = 6. The matching M′n is highlighted.
Theorem 2: For any matching M of Gn, let τ∗(M) denote the number of rounds to converge
to the perfect matching when starting from M. Then, for any fixed constant 0 < γ < 1, τ∗(M) is
exponentially large in γn with high probability for a 1−O(n2−(1−γ)n) fraction of all the matchings
M such that d(M) = 1.
Here we only provide a sketch of the proof, whose details are presented in Appendix B. To
get an understanding of the algorithm’s dynamics, consider the matching
M′n = {(ℓi, fi−1) : 2 ≤ i ≤ n},
highlighted in Figure 3 for the case of n = 6. Observe that d(M′n) = 1 and, under M′n, ℓ1 is
poor, and the remaining leaders are stable. According to the algorithm, ℓ1 attempts to recruit
f1 (currently in ℓ2’s team). If f1 accepts, then ℓ1 becomes stable and ℓ2 becomes poor (and can
in turn attempt to recruit either f1 or f2). After each round, there exists a unique poor leader
until the stable matching is reached. The stable matching is reached when ℓn−1 (ℓ5 in Figure 3)
becomes poor and then successfully recruits fn−1 ( f5 in Figure 3), and finally ℓn successfully
recruits fn (recall that leaders prefer unmatched followers).
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In general, fix any matching M of Gn such that d(M) = 1. In M, there is a single poor
leader ℓi0 and a single unmatched follower fiK . M is associated to a unique deficit-decreasing
path ℓi0 , fi0 , . . . , ℓiK−1, fiK−1 , ℓiK , fiK . We define the height h(M) of M as follows. If K ≥ 1 then
h(M) = iK−1, if K = 0 then h(M) = 0.
Starting from M, for every t < τ(M), the matching M(t) at the beginning of round t has deficit
d(M(t)) = 1 (by Property 1), a single poor leader denoted by ℓi(t), the single unmatched follower
fiK and height h(M(t)) = h(M) = iK−1. The stochastic process {i(t)} tracking the position of the
poor leader ℓi(t) is not a classical random walk on {ℓ1, . . . , ℓiK } and its transition probabilities at
each round depend on the current matching. The time to reach stability is upper bounded by
min{t : i(t) = h(M)}, that is, the first round in which ℓh(M) becomes poor (since ℓh(M) can then
match with fh(M) leaving ℓiK poor, who would in turn match with the unmatched follower fiK ,
thus reaching the stable matching).
We prove a one-to-one correspondence between the matchings M(t) reachable from M in
which i(t) ≤ h(M) (note that d(M(t)) = 1 for each of them) and the nodes of a tree whose
size is exponentially large in the height h(M). In particular, we can show that the process
{M(t) : t ≥ 0, M(0) = M} is equivalent to a classical random walk on the nodes of the tree,
and that reaching the matching with i(t) = h(M) corresponds to reaching the root of the tree.
A random walk starting at any node of the tree visits the root after a number of steps that is
exponentially large in the height h(M) with high probability. Finally, the proof of Theorem 2 is
completed by arguing that, for any constant 0 < γ < 1, a 1−O(n2−(1−γ)n) fraction of all matchings
M of Gn such that d(M) = 1 have height h(M) ≥ γn.
VI. Simulations
In this section, the performance of our algorithm is further evaluated through simulation. In
Figure 4, the algorithm’s average convergence time on the sequence of networks Gn defined in
Section V is shown (in logarithmic scale). On the one hand, the thick solid line suggests that
the average number of rounds to reach a 0.9-approximate stable matching is upper bounded by
a polynomial of small degree, consistently with Theorem 1. On the other hand, convergence to
the stable matching requires an average number of rounds that grows exponentially in n (thin
solid line), as predicted by Theorem 2. Moreover, the dotted line represents the average time
after which all followers become matched, that grows slowly with n.
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Fig. 4. Algorithm’s convergence time on the sequence of networks Gn.
Figure 5 shows the algorithm’s performance in reaching successively finer approximations of
the best matching on random networks G(n,m, ρ). Here, G(n,m, ρ) refers to a random bipartite
network with n leaders and m followers, in which each edge exists independently of the others
with probability ρ (we fixed ρ = 0.04), and with constraint cℓ = min{m/n, |Nℓ|} for each leader
ℓ . For each of the (n,m) pairs that we considered, 20 random G(n,m, ρ) were generated, and
the algorithm was run 20 times on each. We observe that, consistently with Theorem 1, τ(ε)
increases both when ε decreases (i.e., when a finer approximation is desired) and when the
number m of followers increases. The plot visually suggests that a good solution is reached
quickly, while most of the time is spent in the attempt of improving it to the best solution.
VII. Discussion
The distributed algorithm we proposed, in which leaders and followers act according to simple
local rules, is computationally tractable and allows us to derive performance guarantees in the
form of theorems. Despite its simplicity, the algorithm is shown to reach an arbitrarily close
approximation of a stable matching (or of a best matching) in polynomial time in any network.
However, in general there can be an exponential gap between reaching an approximate solution
and a stable solution.
In the proposed algorithm, leaders do not communicate between each other, and only act in
response to their own status and the status of their neighborhoods. The only collaboration between
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Fig. 5. Algorithm’s average time to reach a (1 − ε)-approximate best matching on random bipartite networks G(n,m, ρ), for
ρ = 0.04.
them consists in the fact that the leaders whose size constraints are satisfied do not attempt to
recruit additional matched followers, and this is justified since recruiting more followers might
be costly. How communication between leaders affects performance is an open question, as well
as determining what amounts of communication and complexity are necessary to remove the
exponential gap in the case of unbounded degree networks.
Finally, in Section V, we defined a sequence of networks in which the maximum degree of
the leaders scales linearly with the network size. It would be interesting to understand whether
a counterexample in which the maximum degree scales more slowly (e.g., logarithmically in the
network size) could be derived.
Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Given the matching M and the stable matching N, for brevity we write deficit-decreasing path
instead of deficit-decreasing path in M ⊕ N relative to M. Similarly, by telling that leader ℓ and
follower f are matched we mean that (ℓ, f ) ∈ M, unless otherwise specified.
We prove a stronger claim than the one stated in the lemma, proceeding as follows. First, we
show that for each leader ℓ with deficit dℓ(M) > 0 there are at least dℓ(M) follower-disjoint deficit-
DRAFT
17
PSfrag replacements
Fig. 6. A leader ℓ with constraint cℓ, degree |Nℓ| ≥ cℓ and deficit dℓ(M). Matched edges are highlighted. ℓ is matched to exactly
cℓ − dℓ(M) followers (depicted on the right). Among the other k ≥ dℓ(M) followers in Nℓ, h < k of them are the first followers
on h follower-disjoint deficit-decreasing paths starting at ℓ (these paths are denoted by P1, . . . , Ph), and none of the remaining
k − h (denoted by f1, . . . , fk−h ) is the first follower of a deficit-decreasing paths starting at ℓ.
decreasing paths starting at ℓ. Then, we argue that d(M) follower-disjoint deficit-decreasing paths
can be chosen, dℓ(M) of which start at each leader ℓ with deficit dℓ(M) > 0.
Consider a leader ℓ with dℓ(M) > 0. Assume by contradiction that there are strictly less then
dℓ(M) follower-disjoint deficit-decreasing paths starting at ℓ, and refer to Fig. 6 for a schematic
representation.
Since ℓ has a team size constraint cℓ > 0, there are exactly cℓ−dℓ(M) followers that are matched
to ℓ. Observe that no follower matched to ℓ can be the first follower of a deficit-decreasing path
starting at ℓ, since a deficit-decreasing path starts with an edge in N\M.
Since G admits a stable matching, the neighborhood Nℓ of ℓ has size |Nℓ | ≥ cℓ. Therefore,
there are are k ≥ dℓ(M) followers in Nℓ that are not matched to ℓ. Assume that h < dℓ(M) of the
followers in Nℓ are the first followers of h follower-disjoint deficit-decreasing paths starting at
ℓ (these paths are denoted by P1, . . . , Ph in Figure 6). Denote the remaining k − h > 0 followers
by f1, . . . , fk−h, and assume by contradiction that none among them is the first follower of a
deficit-decreasing path starting at ℓ (this is equivalent to assuming that there are strictly less
than dℓ(M) follower-disjoint deficit-decreasing paths starting at ℓ).
Observe that, in order to become stable, ℓ needs to match with at least one additional follower
among { f1, . . . , fk−h}. We show that, under the assumption above, a one-unit reduction in the deficit
of ℓ would eventually result in a one-unit increase of the deficit of another leader, implying that
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Fig. 7. If f ′′ is not matched then ℓ, f ′, ℓ′, f ′′ would be a deficit-decreasing path (shown at the top of the figure, in which
matching edges are highlighted), contradicting the assumption that no follower in { f1, . . . , fk−h} can be the first follower of a
deficit-decreasing path starting at ℓ. Therefore, f ′′ is matched to a leader ℓ′′ (the bottom of the figure represents the case of
ℓ , ℓ′′).
G does not admit a stable matching, generating a contradiction.
Consider any follower f ′ ∈ { f1, . . . , fk−h}, and observe that f ′ is matched in M since otherwise
ℓ f ′ would be a deficit-decreasing path starting at ℓ. Let ℓ′ be the leader such that (ℓ′, f ′) ∈ M,
and observe that if ℓ′ is matched to all followers in Nℓ′ then ℓ cannot match to f ′ without causing
a one-unit increase of the deficit of ℓ′. Therefore assume that in Nℓ′ there is a follower f ′′ such
that (ℓ′′, f ′′) ∈ M for some leader ℓ′′ , ℓ′ ( f ′′ is matched in M since otherwise ℓ, f ′, ℓ′, f ′′ would
be a deficit-decreasing path starting at ℓ, see Fig. 7). In the following two cases ℓ cannot match
to f ′ without eventually increasing the deficit of another leader.
(i) ℓ′′ = ℓ. In this case ℓ, f ′, ℓ′, f ′′, ℓ is a cycle, and if ℓ matches to f ′ then the deficit of a
leader in the cycle must increase of one unit.
(ii) ℓ′′ , ℓ and ℓ′′ is matched to all followers in Nℓ′′ other than f ′. In this case if ℓ matches to
f ′ then the deficit of a leader on the path ℓ, f ′, ℓ′, f ′′, ℓ′′ must eventually increase by a unit.
Therefore assume that in Nℓ′′ there is a follower f ′′′ such that (ℓ′′′, f ′′′) ∈ M for some leader
ℓ′′′ , ℓ′′ (again, f ′′′ is matched in M since otherwise ℓ, f ′, ℓ′, f ′′, ℓ′′, f ′′′ would be a deficit-
decreasing path). Again, ℓ cannot match to f ′ without eventually increasing the deficit of another
leader if either ℓ′′′ = ℓ or ℓ′′′ = ℓ′ (each similar to the case (i) above), or if ℓ′′′ is matched to all
followers in Nℓ′′ other than f ′, f ′′ (similar to the case (ii) above).
By iteration, it follows that ℓ cannot match to any follower f ′ ∈ { f1, . . . , fk−h} without eventually
increasing the deficit of another leader, in contradiction with the existence of the stable matching
N. Hence, there are at least dℓ(M) follower-disjoint deficit-decreasing paths starting at ℓ.
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Fig. 8. Given the matching at the top of the figure (matching edges are highlighted), assume that both ℓ0 and ℓ1 are poor, and
that f3 is unmatched. The deficit-decreasing paths P = ℓ0, f1, ℓ1, f2, ℓ2, f3 and P′ = ℓ0, f1, ℓ1, f2 are not follower-disjoint. If P′ is
solved (shown at the bottom of the figure), then P is not solved, and vice versa.
To complete the proof of the lemma, we show that we can choose d(M) follower-disjoint
deficit-decreasing paths, dℓ(M) of which start at each leader ℓ with dℓ(M) > 0.
We proceed by contradiction, and make the following assumption. Let P be any set of d(M)
deficit-decreasing paths, dℓ(M) of which start at each leader ℓ with dℓ(M) > 0 (denote by Pℓ
the elements of P starting at ℓ); then, there are two leaders ℓ, ℓ′ such that two paths P ∈ Pℓ,
P′ ∈ Pℓ′ are not follower-disjoint. In order to reach the stable matching N starting from M, a set
of d(M) deficit-decreasing paths must be solved. However, if P is solved (by “flipping” matched
edges into unmatched edges, and vice versa) then P′ is not solved, and if P′ is solved then P
is not solved (see Figures 8 and 9 for a schematic representation). If follows that N cannot be
reached from M by solving the d(M) deficit-decreasing paths in P.
The last argument holds for any choice of P, and this generates a contradiction on the
reachability of N starting from M (observe that N can be reached from M in finite time, e.g. by
a cat-and-mouse argument on the space of all the matchings of G). Hence, we can choose d(M)
follower-disjoint deficit-decreasing paths, dℓ(M) of which start at each leader ℓ with dℓ(M) > 0,
and the lemma is proven.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Let Mn be the set of all the matchings of Gn such that d(M) = 1. We proceed as follows. First,
we show that each M ∈ Mn is uniquely identified by the set of the leaders that are not matched
with “horizontal” edges (that is, leaders ℓi such that (ℓi, fi) < M). Second, we define trees T ∗m,
m ≥ 1 such that a random walk on T ∗m starting at any node different than the root hits the root
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Fig. 9. If, under the matching highlighted in the figure, both ℓ and ℓ′ are poor and f1 is unmatched then there are two
deficit-decreasing paths that are not follower-disjoint (one starting at ℓ ad ending at f1, the other starting at ℓ′ ad ending at f1).
If one of them is solved then the other is not solved, and vice versa.
after a number of steps that is exponentially large in m with high probability. Third, for each
matching M ∈ Mn we define a quantity h(M) that we call the height of M and we argue that,
when initialized at M, the algorithm’s dynamics is equivalent to a random walk on the tree T ∗h(M)
and reaching the stable matching of Gn corresponds to reaching the root of T ∗h(M) (and therefore
it requires a number of rounds that is exponentially large in h(M) with high probability). Finally,
by a counting argument, we show that for any constant 0 < γ < 1 a 1 − O(n2−(1−γ)n) fraction of
all the matchings in Mn have height at least γn, completing the proof of the theorem.
A. Properties of the matchings in Mn.
Matchings in Mn enjoy the following structural properties.
Lemma 3: Let M ∈ Mn. The following properties hold.
(1) There are a single poor leader ℓi∗(M) and a single unmatched follower ℓ j∗(M) in M.
(2) 1 ≤ i∗(M) ≤ j∗(M) ≤ n.
(3) (ℓk, fk) ∈ M for all k < i∗(M) and all k > j∗(M).
(4) Let I(M) = { j0, j1, . . . , jK} be the sorted set of indexes j such that (ℓ j, f j) < M. Then
(a) j1 = i∗(M) and jK = j∗(M).
(b) (ℓ jk+1 , f jk) ∈ M for all k ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1}.
Proof: Property (1). Since d(M) = ∑ℓ∈L dℓ(M) = 1, there is a single poor leader ℓi∗(M) in M.
Since cℓ = 1 for all ℓ ∈ L, each leader ℓ , ℓi∗(M) is matched to a single follower. It follows that
there is a unique unmatched follower f j∗(M).
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Property (2). Suppose by contradiction that i∗(M) > j∗(M). Since Nℓ j∗ (M) = { f1, . . . , f j∗(M)} and
f j∗(M) is unmatched, leader ℓ j∗(M) is matched to one of the followers in { f1, . . . , f j∗(M)−1}. Hence,
the j∗(M)−1 leaders ℓ1, . . . , ℓ j∗(M)−1 are matched to at most j∗(M)−2 out of the j∗(M)−1 followers
f1, . . . , f j∗(M)−1, and one of them is necessarily poor, contradicting Property (1). Therefore, i∗(M) ≤
j∗(M).
Property (3). We proceed by induction. If i∗(M) > 1, then (ℓ1, f1) ∈ M since Nℓ1 = { f1} and ℓ1 is
matched with a follower. Assume that if i∗(M) > j then (ℓk, fk) ∈ M for all k ≤ j. If i∗(M) > j+1,
then, by the inductive assumption, ℓ j+1 can only be matched to f j+1 since Nℓ j+1 = { f1, . . . , f j+1}.
This shows that (ℓk, fk) ∈ M for all k < i∗(M). If j∗(M) < n then (ℓn, fn) ∈ M since fn is matched
and ℓn is the only leader connected to fn. Assume by induction that if j∗(M) < j then (ℓk, fk) ∈ M
for all k ≥ j. If j∗(M) < j − 1, then, by the inductive assumption, f j−1 can only be matched to
ℓ j−1 since f j−1 is adjacent to ℓ j−1, . . . , ℓn. This shows that (ℓk, fk) ∈ M for all k > j∗(M).
Property (4). If K = 0 then M = {(ℓi, fi) : i , i∗(M)}, j∗(M) = i∗(M), and properties (4a) and
(4b) trivially hold. Now consider K ≥ 1. Let I(M) = { j0, j1, . . . , jK} be the sorted set of indexes
j such that (ℓ j, f j) < M. By property (3), we have that j0 = i∗(M) and jK = j∗(M), therefore
property (4a) follows. Hence, (ℓ j2 , f j1) ∈ M since (ℓk, fk) ∈ M for all k ∈ { j1 + 1, . . . , j2 − 1} by
definition of I(M), and Nℓ j2 = { f1, . . . , f j2}. Property (4b) follows by induction.
Lemma 3 states that non-horizontal matching edges do not intersect. In particular, given a
matching M ∈ Mn, the set I(M) represents the set of (the sorted indexes of) the leaders that are
not matched with horizontal edges (see Figure 10 for an example), ℓi∗(M) for i∗(M) = minI(M) is
the unique unmatched leader, and ℓ j∗(M) for j∗(M) = maxI(M) is the unique unmatched follower.
Recall that M∗n = {(ℓk, fk) : 1 ≤ k ≤ n} is the unique stable matching of Gn, and let I(M∗n) = ∅.
Lemma 3 implies that every matching M ∈ Mn ∪ {M∗n} is uniquely identified by the set I(M).
In particular, the following result holds.
Lemma 4: Consider the mapping I(·) from Mn ∪ {M∗n} to S =
{
A : A ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
} defined by
M 7→ I(M). Then I(·) is a bijection.
Proof: The stable matching M∗n is associated to I(M∗n) = ∅. The mapping I(·) is injective
since if M, M′ ∈ Mn and M , M′ then I(M) , I(M′). To see that I(·) is surjective, fix K ≤ n−1
and A = {i0, i1, . . . , iK} ∈ S such that 1 ≤ i0 < i1 < . . . < iK ≤ n. The matching M ∈ Mn such that
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Fig. 10. An example of a matching M of G6 with d(M) = 1. M is uniquely determined by the set I(M) = {2, 4, 6}, that
encodes the following: ℓ2 is not matched, ℓ4 is matched with f2, ℓ6 is matched with f4, f6 is not matched. Also note that
P(M) = ℓ2, f2, ℓ4, f4, ℓ6, f6 is the unique deficit-decreasing path relative to M.
I(M) = A is given by
M =
{(ℓik+1 , fik) : 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1} ∪ {(ℓk, fk) : k < A} ∈ Mn.
Remark 1: Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 imply that every matching M ∈ Mn, I(M) = {i0, . . . , iK},
is associated to a unique deficit-decreasing path in M ⊕ M∗n relative to M, given by
P(M) = ℓi0 , fi0, ℓi1 , fi1 , . . . , ℓiK , fiK .
Too see this, observe that M\M∗n is given by the non-horizontal edges in M, while M∗n\M is
given by the horizontal edges that are not in M. Therefore, by Lemma 3,
M\M∗n =
{(ℓi1 , fi0), (ℓi2 , fi1), . . . , (ℓiK , fiK−1)},
M∗n\M =
{(ℓi0 , fi0), (ℓi1 , fi1), . . . , (ℓiK , fiK )},
and the set of edges in P(M) is equal to M ⊕ M∗n. The uniqueness of P(M) follows since
I(M) is unique by Lemma 4 and there is no other way to connect the poor leader ℓi0 and the
unmatched follower fiK with a path. This suggests that, given a matching M ∈ Mn, the unique
deficit-decreasing path P(M) must be “solved” in order to reach the stable matching of Gn.
B. The tree T ∗m
Definition 9: Let T1 be a labeled rooted tree with a singleton node with label 1. Inductively,
for i ≤ 2, let Ti be the labeled rooted tree whose root is labeled with i and its i − 1 children
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are the roots of copies of T1, . . . , Ti−1. We define T ∗m to be the tree with a root with label m + 1
whose only child is the root of a copy of Tm (see Figure 11 for a visual representation). Let r∗
denote the root of T ∗m.
Fig. 11. The three T ∗m for m = 5.
We show that the hitting time of r∗ for a random walk on T ∗m starting at any node u , r∗
is exponential in m with high probability. For a node u , r∗, we call the edge that connects u
to its parent u’s exit edge. For any subtree Ti ⊂ T ∗m, let Zi be the random variable denoting the
number of steps that it takes for a walk starting at the root of Ti to exit Ti (that is, to hit the
parent of the root of Ti). The following lemma provides an exponential lower bound on Zi.
Lemma 5: There exist positive constants α, γ > 0 such that, for all i ≥ 2,
Pr[Zi ≥ γ · 2i/(α log
2 i)] ≥ 1 − 1
log i
.
Proof: We proceed by induction on i. For convenience, define g(i) = α log2 i and f (i) =
γ · 2i/g(i) for some α, γ > 0. For any α > 0 and i ≥ 2, we can choose γ > 0 such that f (i) ≤ 1;
therefore, as Zi ≥ 1 with probability 1, the claim holds trivially for any i ≤ i∗, where i∗ is a
suitably large constant.
Now consider any i ≥ i∗ and suppose the claim holds up to i − 1. Every time the walk is on
the root of Ti, it exits Ti with probability 1/i (since the root of Ti has i neighbors: one parent
and i − 1 children). Therefore, letting Et be the event that the first t times the walk is on the
root of Ti it does not exit Ti, we have Pr[Et] ≥ 1 − t/i. Let t = i/(2 log i), and let D j, 1 ≤ j ≤ t,
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be the event that, when it is on the root of Ti for the j-th time, the walk moves to the root of
one of the subtrees Ti−g(i), . . . , Ti−1 and takes at least f (i − g(i)) steps to exit that subtree. For
1 ≤ j ≤ t, we have
Pr[D j | Et] ≥
g(i)
i
· Pr[Zi−g(i) ≥ f (i − g(i))]
≥
g(i)
i
·
(
1 − 1
log(i − g(i))
)
,
by the induction hypothesis on Zi−g(i). Letting χ j be the indicator function of the event D j for
1 ≤ j ≤ t, the probability that at least two of the events D j happen, given Et, is lower bounded
by:
Pr

t∑
j=1
χ j ≥ 2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Et
 ≥ Pr

t/2∑
j=1
χ j ≥ 1,
t∑
j=t/2+1
χ j ≥ 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Et

= Pr

t/2∑
j=1
χ j ≥ 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Et

2
.
By union bound, we can write
Pr

t/2∑
j=1
χ j ≥ 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Et

≥ 1 −
t/2∏
i=1
(
1 − Pr[D j|Et]
)
≥ 1 −
(
1 − g(i)
i
(
1 − 1log(i − g(i))
))t/2
≥ 1 − exp
[
−
α log i
4
(
1 − 1
log(i − g(i))
)]
≥ 1 − 1
iα/8
,
where the last step holds for i sufficiently large so that log(i − g(i)) ≥ 2. This implies that
Pr

t∑
j=1
χ j ≥ 2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Et
 ≥
(
1 − 1
iα/8
)2
≥ 1 − 2
iα/8
.
Therefore, we conclude that
Pr[Zi ≥ 2 · f (i − g(i))] ≥ Pr

t∑
j=1
χ j ≥ 2

≥ Pr

t∑
j=1
χ j ≥ 2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Et
Pr[Et]
≥
(
1 − 2
iα/8
) (
1 − t
i
)
≥ 1 − 1log i ,
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where the last step holds by choosing α sufficiently large. The claim follows since 2 · f (i−g(i)) ≥
f (i).
Note that a random walk starting at any node u , r∗ has to exit Tm before hitting r∗. Therefore,
an application of Lemma 5 to Tm yields a lower bound to the hitting time of r∗ when starting
at any node u , r∗.
Corollary 2: The hitting time of r∗ of a random walk starting at any node u , r∗ is 2Ω(n/ log2 n)
with high probability.
C. The dynamics of the algorithm starting from M ∈ Mn
For ease of presentation, we set the probability parameters of the algorithms to p = q = 1.
Setting p = 1 means that a poor leader always proposes to a follower. Setting q = 1 means that
a follower always accepts an incoming request. Our result holds for any choice of p and q.
By Lemma 4, every matching M ∈ Mn ∪ {M∗n} is uniquely identified by the set I(M) = {k :
(ℓk, fk) < M}.
Definition 10 (The height of a matching): Let M ∈ Mn, I(M) = {i0, . . . , iK}. The height h(M)
of M is defined as follows. If K = 0 then h(M) = 0. If K ≥ 1 then h(M) = iK−1 ∈ {1 . . . , n − 1}.
For a matching M ∈ Mn such that h(M) > 0 we can write I(M) = {i0, . . . , h(M), iK}. For each
t ≥ 0, let M(t) be the matching at the beginning of round t of the algorithm, and for ease of
notation let I(t) = I(M(t)). For a matching M ∈ Mn let
τ∗(M) = min {t : M(t) = M∗n |M(0) = M}
be the number of steps that the algorithm needs to reach the stable matching starting from M.
Note that, with p = q = 1, t∗(M) = 1 for every M ∈ Mn such that h(M) = 0 (that is, |I(M)| =
1), since according to the algorithm leaders prefer unmatched followers. We are interested in
relating τ∗(m) and h(M) for every matching M ∈ Mn such that h(M) > 0 (that is, |I(M)| > 1).
We study how the matching evolves over time through the Markov process {I(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤
τ∗(M)}. Since I(M∗n) = ∅, τ∗(M) = min{t : I(t) = ∅}. The state space of the Markov process
is given by the set S defined in Lemma 4. The transition probabilities are characterized by the
following lemma.
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Lemma 6: Conditional on I(t) = I ∈ S, |I| > 1, the transition probabilities at time t are given
by
Pr
(
I(t + 1) = I′
∣∣∣I(t) = I) = 1
min I if I
′ ∈
{
I ∪ {k} : k < min I
}
∪
{
I\{min I}
}
,
and 0 otherwise. Moreover Pr(I(t + 1) = ∅|I(t) = ∅) = 1, and Pr(I(t + 1) = ∅|I(t) = I) = 1 for
every I sich that |I| = 1.
Proof: The case of I(t) = ∅ corresponds to the stable matching M∗n, which is an absorbing
state for the Markov process. In the case of |I(t)| = 1, we have that h(M) = 0, and p = q = 1
implies that that I(t + 1) = ∅.
Consider now |I| > 1. Conditional on I(t) = I, the poor leader is ℓmin I and has degree min I
and neighborhood Nmin I = { f1, . . . , fmin I}, and chooses one of the followers in Nmin I uniformly at
random. If ℓmin I chooses follower fk for some k < min I then the leader ℓk becomes poor, since
by property (3) of Lemma 3 ℓk was matched to fk in M(t), and we have that I(t+1) = I∪{k}. If
instead ℓmin I chooses follower fmin I (matched to ℓmin(I\min I) in M(t) by property (4) of Lemma 3),
then I(t + 1) = I\{min I}.
For every matching M ∈ Mn such that h(M) > 0 and I(M) = {i0, . . . , iK}, define the matching
L(M) = {(ℓ j, f j) : j , iK} and τ(M) = min{t : M(t) = L(M)}, and observe that h(L(M)) = 0 and
τ∗(M) > τ(M) (in particular, τ∗(M) = 1 + τ(M) for p = q = 1).
For every matching M such that |I(M)| > 1, let R(M) be the set of the matchings in Mn that
can be reached from M (after one or multiple steps). According to the transition probabilities
defined by Lemma 6, it is easy to see that
R(M) =
{
L(M)
}
∪
{
M′ ∈ Mn : I(M′) = A ∪ {h(M), iK}, A ⊆ {1, . . . , h(M) − 1}
}
.
Observe that every M′ ∈ R(M)\{L(M)} has height h(M′) = h(M). The following lemma charac-
terizes the one-to-one correspondence between matchings in R(M) and nodes of the tree T ∗h(M).
Lemma 7: Consider the mapping ω(·) from R(M) to T ∗h(M) defined as follows. Let ω(L(M)) =
r, where r is the root of T ∗h(M). For M′ ∈ R(M)\{L(M)} and I(M′) = I, let ω(M′) be the node
of T ∗h(M) with label min I and connected to the root with a path of nodes labeled by the sorted
indexes in I\{min I}. Then ω(·) is a bijection.
The proof is omitted since it directly follows from the construction of the tree T ∗h(M) and the
mapping I(·).
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Lemma 8: The stochastic process {I(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ τ(M)|M(0) = M} is equivalent to a random
walk on T ∗h(M) starting at ω(M).
Proof: It suffices to show that the transition probabilities between two matchings M1, M2 ∈
R(M) are nonzero if and only if the nodes ω(M1) and ω(M2) are adjacent in T ∗h(M). To prove
the “only if” direction, assume that M1, M2 ∈ R(M) are such that there is a nonzero transition
probability from M1 to M2 (and therefore from M2 to M1). Let I(M1) = I1 and I(M2) = I2.
According to the transition probabilities given above, there are two possible cases. In the first
case, I2 = I1 ∪ {k} for some k < min I1, and ω(M1) is a child of ω(M1). In the second case
I2 = I1\{min I1} and ω(M2) is the parent of ω(M1). The proof of the other direction is similar.
To summarize, the number of steps that the algorithm needs to reach the stable matching of Gn
starting from M ∈ Mn with h(M) > 0 is upper bounded by the time τ(M) to reach the matching
L(M), and reaching L(M) is equivalent to reaching the root of T ∗h(M) starting from the node
ω(M). By Corollary 2, τ(M) is exponentially large in h(M) with high probability. To complete
the proof of the theorem, we show that, for any constant 0 < γ < 1, a 1 − O(n2−(1−γ)n) fraction
of the matchings M ∈ Mn have h(M) ≥ γn. This is done through a counting argument.
D. The fraction of the matchings M ∈ Mn such that h(M) ≥ γn
Let N be the number of matchings in Mn. Fixed a constant 0 < γ < 1, let Mγ = {M ∈ Mn :
h(M) < γn} and let Nγ = |Mγ|. For j = 0, . . . , n−1, let N( j) be the number of matchings M ∈ Mn
such that h(M) = j. It follows that
N =
n−1∑
j=0
N( j), Nγ ≤
⌈γn⌉−1∑
j=0
N( j).
Lemma 9: N(0) = n and N( j) = (n − j)2 j−1 for all j = 1, . . . , n − 1.
Proof: N(0) = n since there are n matchings M with h(M) = 0, that is, the matchings
{(ℓ j, f j) : j , k} for 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Fix j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. By Lemma 4, a matching M ∈ Mn with h(M) = j is uniquely identified
by a set I(M) = {i0, . . . , iK−1, iK} for some 1 ≤ K ≤ n − 1 and iK−1 = j. Since I(·) is a bijection,
to determine N( j) we need to count all subsets of {1 . . . , n} of the form {i0, . . . , j, iK}. There are
2 j−1 subsets of {1, . . . , j−1} and n− j ways to choose iK ∈ { j+1, . . . , n}, thus N( j) = (n− j)2 j−1.
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We now show that for any constant 0 < γ < 1, the fraction of matchings M ∈ Mn such that
h(M) < γn goes to zero exponentially fast in n
Lemma 10: Fix 0 < γ < 1. Then, Nγ/N = O(n2−(1−γ)n).
Proof: We first compute N.
N =
n−1∑
i=0
N(i) = n +
n−1∑
i=1
(n − i)2i−1 = n + n
n−2∑
i=0
2i −
n−1∑
i=1
i2i−1.
The second sum can be shown (e.g. by induction) to be equal to (n − 1) + (n − 2)(2n−1 − 1).
Therefore,
N = n + n(2n−1 − 1) − (n − 1) − (n − 2)(2n−1 − 1) = 2n − 1 = Ω(2n).
Similarly, letting k = ⌈γn⌉ we have that,
Nγ ≤
k−1∑
i=0
N(i) = n + n
k−2∑
i=0
2i −
k−1∑
i=1
i2i−1
= n + n(2k−1 − 1) − (k − 1) − (k − 2)(2k−1 − 1)
= 2k−1(n − k − 2) − 1 = O(n2⌈γn⌉).
Therefore, the fraction of matchings in Mn with height h(M) < γn is Nγ/N = O(n2−(1−γ)n).
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